Food Fight
R. R. Reno’s response to my “pushback” shows that he is notconvinced of the gravity of the harms of conventional farming and agribusiness,nor the substantial benefits of small-scale, sustainable farming (“Inequalityand Agency,” March). In other words, for Reno, what is primarily at issue hereis not health (of land, animals, eaters, farmers, community), but merelytaste. He enjoys tasty, local, sustainable, artisanal cheese, beer, andbread, but does not voice concerns about the exploitation of the land, animals,farmers, eaters, and communities involved in much of conventional farming andagribusiness. Therefore, it makes sense that he says “but, please, let’s notconfuse all this with virtue.”
I love tasty food—as Reno points out, who doesn’t? However,let this be very clear: I did not become a small-scale, sustainable farmerbecause I have an exceptional palate. Rather, I believe that what is at issuehere is good stewardship and its resultant health; therefore, virtue is exactlywhat we are talking about. It is vicious to (knowingly or unknowingly)damage the gifts God has given us—gifts of land, animals, our bodies, andthose of our families and neighbors. Therefore, in very particular ways, Ibelieve my work is virtuous work—the work of caring for the gifts Godhas given me and loving my neighbors (present and future) with healthy land andfood.
Now this brings us to the crux of the matter. Am I right?Are conventional farming and agribusiness, as they relate to stewardship andhealth, so bad? And is small-scale, sustainable farming so good? If Reno wantsto dismiss the ethical dimension of this issue, he will have to convince methat what happens in a confined poultry house from start to finish—and itscomplete impact on land, chicken, farmer, eater, community—is ethicallydefensible, especially in the face of the viable and sensible alternativesoffered by operations like my own. (Some naysayers argue that you cannot “feedthe world” with my kind of farming. This is not true, but I will not take upthat extended argument here.)
Virtuous Christians respect and care for God’s gifts andprovide themselves, their families, and others with one of the most fundamentalhuman goods—health. Therefore, if Christians are convinced by argumentsexplaining the general poor stewardship and harm of conventional farming andagribusiness and the general good stewardship and health of small-scale,sustainable farming, then they must take this issue seriously.
Please do not let the liberal elite shoddily andincoherently “own” this issue. This is our virtue to claim, and live, and fullyarticulate! We could start with a prayer from the Mundelein Psalter:“God our creator, you gave us the earth to cultivate and the sun to serve ourneeds. Help us to spend this day for your glory and our neighbor’s good.”
Jesse Straight
warrenton, virginia
Many thanks to R. R. Reno for his support of diversefarmers. My husband and two of his brothers run a dairy farm. They care foreight hundred animals, working long hours in conditions often uncomfortable andunpleasant because they love this soil where their ancestors walked, theyconsider themselves stewards of God’s creation, and they feel called to feedthe hungry. Thanks to these men, who are not wealthy, and other “mechanized”farmers of their ilk, the world eats.
Jesse Straight and other small-scale farmers offer a specialservice to their like-minded neighbors. But everyone needs to eat, not justlocavores, foodies, and the health-conscious. Organic practices simply cannotsustain the levels of production necessary to feed the world.
Modern practices keep food costs lower in the U.S. thananywhere else in the world. We spend less of our income on food than any othercountry. But according to a 2011 USDA consumer expenditure survey, spendingpatterns are rising. Reno noted that the “economic top 20 percent has gained anear monopoly on social capital.” This echelon is also setting the tone forwhat’s acceptable to eat. People are starting to be afraid of food that isn’torganic. This is absurd. Food from other farmers is safe, healthy, and subjectto extensive regulation. The trendy marketing campaigns that influence organiceating do no service to the poor. If food has to be organic, it can’t be plentifuland it won’t be cheap.
On Human Rights Day, last December 10, Pope Francisprayed that God would “inspire leaders of government and of business, as wellas all the world’s citizens, to find just and charitable solutions to endhunger by assuring that all people enjoy the right to food.” Perhaps wecitizens can make a contribution to feeding the hungry by transcending the“upper 20 percent” standards not just for morality, but for meat and milk too.
Gina Loehr
marian university
fond du lac, wisconsin
Labeling Desires
The point of Michael Hannon’s article “AgainstHeterosexuality” (March) that I find most interesting and valuable is the ideathat “heterosexuals” have attempted to wrest their own non-procreative sex outof its traditionally sinful realm while leaving “homosexuals” behind.
In American culture today, we speak of the dichotomy betweensame-sex relations and opposite-sex relations, as opposed to sex ordered forthe purpose of procreation and sex not ordered for the purpose of procreation.We appear to have made this shift without understanding what it means for ourinstitutions; the Christian rationale behind marriage being a solelyopposite-sex institution is rooted in a commitment to preserving the unionbetween procreation and family, not revulsion to same-sex attraction. But whenno-fault divorce and contraception have become so commonplace, little remainsof the original arguments.
To proclaim that sex must be restricted to opposite-sexcouples in order to ensure that sex exists only in marriages and forprocreative purposes obviously has deep roots in a coherent moral tradition.But when married couples use contraception, divorces are common even amongChristians, and premarital sex is not the grave taboo it once was, where is therationale for keeping up a barrier against same-sex relations, other thanmisplaced fear and xenophobic revulsion?
I think Hannon and I actually agree that the debate shouldbe about the procreative/non-procreative sexual dichotomy and not thesame-sex/opposite-sex dichotomy, and that we differ only in what the solutionshould be; this subject is the area in which I would have preferred a strongerand less assumptive argument. The debate, then, is a lot harder for my side towin; the arguments for sex ordered toward procreation within marriage are muchstronger than “man-woman good, man-man/woman-woman bad.” But at least we’ll behaving the right discussion.
Gavin Byrnes
washington, d.c.
Michael Hannon’s argument against labeling individuals ashomosexual or heterosexual and instead focusing on the morality (using naturallaw) of their sexual acts makes eminent sense in the abstract. However,classifications such as these can be useful for purposes of research ortreatment in science and law. The labels are primarily a shorthand way ofreferencing sexual attractions and desires.
What is far more difficult—after Vatican II—is articulatinga consistent Catholic sexual morality. When even the Holy Father says “Who am Ito judge?” in answer to a reporter’s question about homosexuality, there islittle clarity for ordinary Catholics. I graduated from an Augustinian collegein 1965 with six credits in the theology of marriage, reinforcing all theteaching of my high school religious sisters. While natural law andAugustine’s moral theology might be difficult for some, the rules derived fromthem were understood by ordinary Catholics: Sexual intimacy is permissible onlyin a sacramental marriage between one man and one woman, and the purpose ofmarriage is the procreation and education of children. All the rest iscommentary!
Then Vatican II brought a sea change. Gaudium et Spessays marriage “is not instituted solely for procreation.” There follow verbosepassages about union, mutual love, and support, etc., sentiments one finds inromantic poetry and in the sincere expressions of homosexual lovers for eachother. And of course, this is followed by a discussion of acceptable birthregulation—in order to limit the natural ends of the goods of marriage? Naturallaw had not changed, but Catholics and their goals had. Try to explain to anRCIA class the moral difference between a pill and an ovulation kit used withthe same contraceptive intent!
Yes, we have been educated in fine distinctions, while theoverall landscape has become hazy. Hannon has presented us with another finelinguistic distinction.
Jan Hicks
oak ridge, tennessee
Michael Hannon’s essay was the most volatile mixture oftruth and hokum I have read in a long time. He makes two fine points: First,regardless of inner desires, we Christians are accountable to behavioralstandards set forth in classic Christian sexual ethics, which inevitablyrevolve around the Christian teaching on marriage; and second, the currentdefinitions of internal desires are a mess. Facebook now lists twenty-ninedifferent self-definitions of gender identity. Christian sexual ethics shouldnot take them seriously.
Now for the hokum: his claim that there are no persistinginternal desires in the vast majority of men and women that are properlyordered toward others of the opposite sex. Those sorts of desires arepresent—and must be disciplined by the virtue of chastity—in at least 95percent of the world’s men and women. And it seems that for a small minority ofmen and women there are persisting but disordered sexual desires for the samesex. Between those two poles there seems to be a lot of mixture and confusion.But to deny that there is an orientation toward heterosexuality in most men andwomen is to deny what centuries of biblical wisdom and human experience havetold us. Heterosexuality is no social construction.
Robert Benne
roanoke college
salem, virginia
Michael Hannon makes an essential point: Labels matter. Iwould add that labels matter especially in narratives, and that the narrativethat controls the labels controls the argument, for labels are themselves bitsof the story.
But labels are useful to the degree they define intrinsicattributes. Therein is the argument concerning sexual orientation. Both sidesare fighting the battle on the question of whether homosexuals are “wired” forhomosexuality, that is, whether there is an intrinsic neurochemical basis forsexual orientation. Hannon does not even address that issue. I invite him to doso in his future writing on the subject.
Frank Pray
newport beach, california
I appreciate Michael Hannon’s piece a good deal, but I failto see why “heterosexuality” is necessarilytied to pride as astructure, or that Hannon has made the case that it is. “Heterosexuality” onlydethrones Jesus as the norm if we think that Jesus’ life and ministry somehowsubvert the normative (creation) order of opposite-sex sexual desires, even ifwe do not use the language of “orientation” to describe those desires.
The singleness of Jesus does not put same-sex desires andopposite-sex desires on the same moral plane. It is, after all, not simplysexual acts that Christ suggests he is interested in, but the whole stable ofthoughts, intentions, and dispositions that make up our inner life (Matt.5:28–30). While Hannon agrees with this, “orientation” emphasizes thestabilityof those desires. But if the end is good and the desire itselfmoral, then naming the stability of recurrence seems like it adds nothing tothe moral evaluation of those desires.
Recurring sexual desires of any sort are not themselves asign of holiness, but recurring sexual desires toward a member of the same sexraise questions that such desires toward a member of the opposite sex do not.Eliminating the aspect of “recurring stability” from those desires—or what hascome to be known in shorthand as our “orientation”—doesn’t eliminate the deeper“heteronormativity” implied in the logic of Scripture. If nothing else, Jesushas a bride, and there is no understanding his life as the pattern for ourlives without grasping the deep, mutually fulfilling, stable, and recurringdesires at the heart of their union.
“Heterosexuality” and “homosexuality” can indeed be doneaway with. I agree with Hannon on this. But the reasons we provide for tossingthem overboard still matter, and we ought to be careful what we send over withthem.
Matthew Lee Anderson
oxford, united kingdom
Like Michael Hannon, I cautiously appropriate Foucault in myown study, and think him generally correct that “heterosexuality” and“homosexuality” are modern social constructs. But there must be a significantcaveat for the Christian.
Serious anthropological research leaves in no doubt the factthat both opposite-sex and same-sex erotic desires are cross-culturalphenomena. These desires are not constituted by culture, only shapedby it. It may be an anachronism to call Oscar Wilde “gay,” for example, butwhat he was nevertheless seems to have been a different instance of thatsomething of which “gay” is the contemporary instance. One can, of course,follow Foucault, denying that there is any “something” here, but only if onefollows Foucault’s near-total nominalism—a position that is bothcounterintuitive and problematic for Christians.
The clear implication of Hannon’s argument is that, because“sexual identity” is socially constructed, it does not exist in any meaningfulsense and can therefore be dispensed with. Yet social constructs per seare real and even necessary to our nature, even if particular constructsare not de essentia naturae humanae.
Imagine Jack. Jack is gay, and American. Both are socialconstructs. It does not pertain to human quiddity, for example, to have a“national identity,” which is a social construct only made possible, obviously,by the evolution of the concept of “nation.” Yet though neither being gay norbeing American, nor even having “sexual” or “national” identities, is essentialto what it means for Jack to be human, those things may be part of what makesJack the particular human we call “Jack.”
To deny that Jack is gay (or American) may not be to denyhis humanity, but it is an attempt to break down who he is as a particularhuman individual, and it has never been an aim of orthodox Christianity toengage in this sort of ideological project of deconstructing and reconstructingpeople. Rather, as St. Paul admonishes, though we are each a “new creation” in Christ(2 Cor. 5:17), “in whatever state each was called, there let him remain withGod” (1 Cor. 7:24).
Aaron Taylor
boston, massachusetts
Michael Hannon replies:
When it comes to moral conclusions, presumably I have lesscommon ground with Gavin Byrnes than with any of my other correspondents. Butfor that very reason, I find his letter extremely encouraging, because it aimsto take our massive disagreement and make it constructive. Byrnes complainsthat, once I had moved us from the playing field of heterosexual vs. homosexualto that of marital vs. nonmarital (where being marital includes beingprocreative in kind), I did not play the game through to the end and give alarger argument attacking nonmarital sex. But unfortunately, making theChristian case against sexual libertinism would require more space than I hadthere—or than I have here—and plenty of ink has been spilt on that clashelsewhere.
Suffice it to say that settling this question will mostlikely require answering some other, much larger, questions: Does this universehave a Creator? Does he care how I live? Has he used my human nature andnatural reason to communicate that care? And has he underscored those moralteachings in revelation? In other words, what separates the classical Christianposition on sex from the contemporary anything-goes alternative is not onesimple argument, but an entire worldview. Naturally, I would love to inviteByrnes to convert to the Christian worldview, beginning and ending in thelove of our Lord. But I’d be a proud fool to expect I could inspire thatconversion in five thousand words.
I am sympathetic to Jan Hicks’s concerns regardingpost-conciliar catechesis. Yet while I would agree with her that we should keepmarriage and its natural fruits at the center of our sexual ethics, I wouldcaution her not to dismiss all “commentary” out of hand. Building sexualmorality around marriage makes our philosophical distinctions accurate, notirrelevant.
I hope one such distinction can dispel Robert Benne’s objection.In attacking heterosexuality as a pernicious social construct, I was notdenying that the vast majority of people are far more likely to be sexuallyaroused by a member of the opposite sex than by one of their own sex. I wassimply arguing that that accidental fact should not constitute an essentialpsychological identity for anyone, and that the frequent occurrence of thisidentity could never ground a proscription against same-sex sodomy anyway.
I want to be very clear about this: “Heterosexual” is notjust a neutral shorthand for “would tend to prefer an opposite-sex sexualpartner.” We do not—and in our culture, cannot—use this terminology in thatsanitized, unassuming way. The language of sexual orientation is inseparablefrom the lies that support it: (1) that our sexual desires reveal a fundamentalfacet of our being, our “sexuality”; (2) that we have a moral obligation todiscover and express that key aspect of ourselves; and (3) that we will not behappy until we do so. To call oneself a heterosexual is to actively situateoneself within this false tradition, and to implicitly endorse thedeterministic anthropology and hedonistic ethics that inform these un-Christianclassifications.
Briefly, to Frank Pray, while polls and experiments may reportpercentage breakdowns between heterosexuals and homosexuals, such studies donot prove that sexual orientation is a natural property. They just build it inas an unexamined premise.
Matthew Lee Anderson is certainly right that “the singlenessof Jesus does not put same-sex desires and opposite-sex desires on the samemoral plane,” and I am terribly sorry if I seemed to imply otherwise! In notingthat Christ is the standard for evaluating sexual vice and virtue, I only meantthat human nature itself is the relevant measure—as John Paul II liked toremind us, Christ reveals man to himself—not some recurring subjectiveexperience of unspecified desire for the opposite sex, which is what“heterosexuality” signifies for us. So I agree with Anderson that sexualcomplementarity is a necessary ingredient in virtuous sexual desire, but I amsure he would agree with me that it’s not a sufficient one.
In short, the problem with “heteronormativity” is not thatit insists on sexual difference; it’s that it fails to insist on anything else.By fetishizing just one aspect of chastity—namely, the sex of the objects ofone’s most frequent sexual attractions—this reductionist ethic wreaks havoc onthe intellectual and moral lives of its practitioners, especially those in itsheterosexual control group. We shouldn’t stop asserting that man and woman weresexually designed for one another, but we must contextualize that vital truthin a way that mere “heteronormativity” does not allow. Man was not naturallydesigned to give himself sexually to women in general, but to a wife, and thatin a very specific way.
In response to Aaron Taylor, while same-sex lust is indeed across-cultural phenomenon, the conceptual scheme by which we understand itstill matters, and as I tried to show, ours is faulty. Of course, the fact thatsomething is a social construct does not mean that we must destroy it; it justmeans that it’s possible to do so. But when a construct is detracting more fromour flourishing than it’s adding—especially if it’s already on the way out—I dothink we ought to try our best to eliminate it. The point isn’t that we shouldhave no social constructs, but that we should have good social constructs.
Finally, I vehemently disagree with Taylor that the Christianfaith does not require the deconstruction and reconstruction of its adherents.“He must increase, but I must decrease” extends to all facets of our lives, andit often involves a drastic revolution in our self-understanding. Christ andhis Church meet us where we are, yes. But they do not leave us there, nor dothey necessarily begin by agreeing with our account of the location.
Damn Yankees
I write to express my dismay about this unfortunate sentencein your March “While We’re At It”: “For those who care, in the office we havethree Red Sox fans and one Yankees fan (he grew up in Brooklyn so he can’t helpit).”
It is difficult to believe that any Christian magazine couldwrite off one of its own as beyond redemption based on the tired left-wing rationalethat he is a mere product of his environment.
Since evangelical zeal seems to have faded on the sixthfloor, let me offer some conversion strategies:
Embrace the young man without warning on a regular basis andwhisper in his ear, “We’ll get you past this Yankees thing.”
Surreptitiously remove tokens of idolatry from his luxuriouscubicle and replace them with inspirational symbols of Red Sox Nation.
Over coffee, quietly raise theological questions such as,“What do you think Steinbrenner and A-Rod will discuss in hell?”
I could go on, of course, but I assume that by now FirstThings is appropriately contrite.
A. M. Juster
belmont, massachusetts
Wiccan’t
As I am what J. Budziszewski might term a Neo-Pagan (I amWiccan), I feel compelled to respond to his essay “Evangelizing Neo-Pagans”(March). Budziszewski writes: “The neo-pagan pretends, when it suits him, thatthere is no morality.” I take ferocious offense at this, as would any otherPagan I know. One would think that any believer who took his convictionsseriously would be similarly offended at such a charge. Can you imagine such aslur against any other religion being tolerated? Although there is nothing tostop a modern Pagan from descending into a life of sinful indulgence andexcess, there is nothing to stop anyone from doing so.
To say that the fear of God’s displeasure is a meaningfulrestraining force on Christian believers is enough to make a cat laugh. We areleft with the observation that the only true control on one’s behavior, as feebleand often ineffective as it is, is self-control. Although it is not as wellknown as the Ten Commandments, there is the Wiccan Rede, which tells us to harmno one. This directive means more than physical harm; it extends to anymalfeasance, any cruelty, or any action that would impose one’s will onsomeone else. There are many who take this seriously.
It can be argued that we are all responsible for our ownbehavior. But when we fail, as we do every day, the modern Pagan does not feelthe need to confess to God and hope for forgiveness. Instead, he sees (or, wecan hope he sees) that he alone is responsible for his failures and must makeamends where he can; he must ask forgiveness not of God, but of the human beinghe has hurt. Budziszewski never explains why he feels it is necessary forChristians to proselytize to (modern-day) Pagans. Perhaps he feels the reasonis so self-apparent that no explanation is needed. Perhaps he feels it is forour own good.
Perhaps he doesn’t realize that this is potentiallydisagreeable. If Budziszewski would successfully witness to Pagans, I wouldsuggest that he learn about our theologies, and resist the temptation to lookupon us as wayward children upon whom fatherly guidance is justly imposed.
Amy L. Finkel
alpharetta, georgia
J. Budziszewski struck one of the key problems we face. Theworld has been taught that the problem with guilt is that one has it. Guiltcomes from outside of us: parents, social mores, institutional religion. Thesolution is for the individual to learn to ignore the guilt on the inside. Thisis the polar opposite of historic Christianity, which says guilt comes frominside—what we are and do that is short of the glory of God—and thesolution is outside of us in Christ crucified for us and for what we have done.
From where did neo-paganism learn this? Not theology, nothistory, not the hard sciences, but psychology. It’s even harder for shepherdsto bring sheep home from the psychologized pew because many splinters havebeen left to fester.
Paul R. Harris
austin, texas
J. Budziszewski replies:
Amy Finkel’s letter presents several difficulties. One isthat I was writing about the default neo-paganism of our culture, which, likeancient paganism, is not so much a creed as a stance. Wicca is a much narrowerslice of the contemporary scene, a creedal neo-paganism, one witharticles of faith. Another difficulty is that she accuses me of so many views Idid not express, for example the absurd opinion that we need not make amendsto persons we have hurt. She does raise one real issue: Am I wrong to say thatthe neo-pagan pretends, when it suits him, that there is no morality? Thatlarge numbers of people do make this pretense when it suits them is tooobvious to belabor. Still, she thinks her creedal neo-paganism, Wicca,is an exception. Is it?
No. Though it does not suit Wiccans to say that there is nomorality, their problem comes to much the same thing, for the morality which itsuits them to propose has no content. To say “Harm no one” is to say nothingunless we are also told who counts as someone and what counts as harm.Besides, if we aren’t told what counts as imposition, then to say onemust never “impose one’s will on someone else” makes moral law unenforceable.For example, the majority of Wiccans support abortion, for they are free todeny that the baby is someone who is harmed. Although a minority of Wiccans dothink abortion imposes harm, even they think it should be allowed, because theywould not want to impose their will upon—well, upon those who are doing theimposing. You see, I do know something about Wiccan theology.
Thanks to Paul Harris for his kind words. I would offer onlyone friendly amendment: The problem is not with psychology per se, butwith the reductionist psychology which says man is just stuff andconscience is just a euphemism for inhibitions pumped in from outside. A fewpsychologists do try to base their work on a Christian view of the humanperson, for example the scholars of the Institute for the PsychologicalSciences in Arlington, Virginia.
Provocations
Engraved in stone on the attic above the entrance toColumbia’s Low Library built in 1895 are the words “For the Advancement of thePublic Good and the Glory of Almighty God.” Brigham Young University’s versionof that are the words from Mormon Scripture: “The Glory of God IsIntelligence.” Ralph Hancock poses this question in “Keeping Faith in Provo”(March): Are Mormon scholars today promoting the glory of God?
The essay clearly draws the battle lines: the ambitious,narrow, worldly scholars who refuse to address the large human questions andseek only fame in the modern academy versus the religiously faithful who standby the eternal principles even at the expense of their careers. That way ofputting it is not quite just. Compassion for the position of gays in modernsociety is as genuinely Mormon (and Christian) as is the defense of the family.The debate is not on the axis of religion against the world but thereconciliation of conflicting righteous principles.
The definition of the contending parties is also a littleoff-key. The Mormon way is not to define some of our fellow Saints as benightedaliens beyond the pale but to work together to solve difficult problems. Makingour religion relevant to modern problems deserves our best effort, but in allthings we must be governed by the compassion and good will that lie at theheart of our faith.
Richard Bushman
columbia university
new york, new york
As one of the very few non-LDS faculty members at BYU, Iperhaps bring a different theological perspective to bear. (I am a member of aProtestant, nondenominational church.) Nevertheless, I generally agree withRalph Hancock’s reading of BYU’s dilemma. His assessment of the tensionsbetween reductionism and holism and between secular training and religiousdevotion seems generally on target. I also agree that these tensions have ledto a compartmentalization between professional and private worldviews that arefrequently incompatible, if not incommensurable.
I do take issue, however, with Hancock when he states thatthe natural sciences are “for the most part . . . safely insulated from thequestions of ultimate purpose that condition our understanding of the meaningof education.” I recognize here that his terms are more than a bit abstract,and thus somewhat difficult to discern precisely. Still, the context of thissentence becomes clearer when he talks about how the value-laden “paradigms andassumptions” of the social sciences and humanities have contributed to theproblematic conditioning of our understanding of education. I should add that Iam on record in several publications supporting this assertion about psychologyin particular.
However, I wonder why Hancock appears to give the naturalsciences a pass in this regard. Are not the natural sciences just as capturedby value-laden paradigms and assumptions? If so, what prevents them, even “forthe most part,” from participating in the conditioning of our understanding ofeducation, not to mention the tensions between reductionism and holism? My ownexperience is that students who major in the natural sciences rather routinelyexhibit a host of conditioned understandings of their education, including:considering reductionism the only way to approach knowledge advancement;viewing measurement and even general evaluation as synonymous withquantification; understanding rigor to mean abstracting away (e.g., thelaboratory tradition) from the thick context of our practical lives; equatingexperience with observation; perceiving “nebulous entities” like meaning aseither not existing or not mattering.
I realize that the natural sciences often get a pass inthese kinds of discussions, but I would contend they should not.
Brent D. Slife
brigham young university
provo, utah
Ralph Hancock points out that the qualifications for tenureat BYU are more closely related to the values of mainstream academia than thoseof BYU’s unique mission. This is no surprise to anyone who has been churnedthrough the academic system. “Publish or perish” is a reality for allprofessors, and it demands a level of specialization that in many casesmandates blindness to the larger questions of human meaning.
This blindness, as Hancock notes, is perhaps lessdetrimental outside of the humanities and social sciences. But what aboutwithin the social sciences, where questions of what is good and just intersectwith the moral standards that the LDS Church proclaims to be true? How can, forexample, a political philosophy professor at BYU be held to publishing thecontent of their research (for tenure) in a situation that mainstream academiawill constantly resist? And in conforming to mainstream academic tenurestandards, is BYU losing talented professors who are best equipped to preparestudents to consider changing moral foundations, but lack professionallyaccepted venues through which to publish what they teach and study?
In my short time at BYU, I watched one of the bestprofessors of my academic career be denied tenure for failing to meetpublishing requirements that were always going to be an uphill battle in hisfield. Additionally, in my own graduate work at the University of Utah, I facedextreme difficulty in completing my thesis because I chose a topic that did notconform to mainstream academia. The response was clear: Conform or leave.
An extension of Hancock’s question may be even morerelevant: Are BYU students equipped to consider and respond to the shiftingmoral foundations of modern society? And can we expect them to be if theinstitutions that educate them do not reward faculty for producing studentscapable of thinking this way?
Kristen Robinson Doe
college station, texas
I applaud Ralph Hancock’s commitment to the religiousmission of his university. I further applaud his call for an alliancebetween mission-based universities in order to articulate the meaning of auniversity in larger society.
I must, however, quibble with his criticism of“bilingualism,” as he calls it—“an ability to speak both the language of theacademy and the language of revealed truths.” For, assuming it is not contraryto the university’s mission, taking on the language of the academy inscholarship need not include suppressing perennial questions in theclassroom, nor does it by necessity lead to secularization of religiousuniversities, as Hancock suggests. One can quite overtly and openly engagein religious discussion in the classroom while avoiding it in one’s scholarshipwithout compartmentalization, because the two activities call for differentaims and language.
In fact, it is one thing to avoid hyper-specialization inthe classroom—a place where first principles are discussed—but it is quiteanother to avoid it in the academy, which prizes scientific analysis andoriginality. If religious scholars and religious institutions, for that matter,want to show the world that the faithful can be reasonable, they must engage inthe pursuits of their fields, which usually demand specialization. In this way,we can model to our students how to be in the world, but not of the world,while showing the culture that it cannot ignore the religiously minded.
Sarah Klitenic Wear
franciscan university of steubenville
steubenville, ohio
Ralph Hancock replies:
I appreciate Richard Bushman’s attention to my article, butI’m afraid he leaves me with the most banal of author’s responses: His critiqueseems to refer to some article other than the one I wrote. I spoke ofchallenges and warned of tendencies; he sees “battle lines.” He simplifies thechallenge I describe in order to dismiss it as based on “the axis of religion againstthe world.” To be sure, I intend in my article to present the reader(especially the BYU reader) with a challenging alternative—but it cannot besimply reduced to the religion/world dichotomy.
Bushman likens BYU’s “The Glory of God Is Intelligence” toColumbia University’s “For the Advancement of the Public Good and the Glory ofAlmighty God”; I would tend rather to distinguish the two mottos. I spoke notat all of “promoting the glory of God”; I spoke of asking questions that thesecular academy (with a view, ultimately, to the human good, or rather, humanprogress) necessarily tends to suppress. My concern was and remains first andforemost intellectual, since I trust the religious benefits to follow from themost venturesome thinking. My argument is not for some holy campaign, asBushman suggests, but for a good ol’ liberal arts education as most conduciveto the full exercise of divine intelligence.
So the Columbia motto, with its pursuit of two separateaims, seems to me a better description of BYU’s current, authoritativemainstream than of the alternative I ask to be considered. The risks inherentin assuming a dichotomy between the human and the divine and thus skipping thequestion of the good are apparent, I think, in Bushman’s reference to “compassionfor the position of gays in modern society.” This assumes that “compassion” isautomatically identical with Christian charity, or that one can truly care fora person without knowing who a person truly is, and thus what is truly good fora being created in God’s image. Is it not possible that a “defense of thefamily,” properly understood, would be essential to informing our charity withregard to self-identified “gays”?
Brother Bushman and I are both believing Latter-day Saints,and this is ultimately far more important than our differences. But ourdifferences matter for the future of LDS education. The “battle lines” between“religion” and “the world” presuppose a certain, constricted understanding ofreason that ought to be questioned from both directions—that’s really the sumand substance of my analysis of and my hope for BYU.
I thank Brent Slife for his support of my critique of thecompartmentalization that prevails in the social sciences and humanities at BYU(as elsewhere, of course), and even more for his valuable work as a teacher andscholar in questioning this compartmentalization. On the question of thenatural sciences, I can only welcome his suggestions.
I also thank Kristen Robinson Doe for citing particularcases of great relevance to my argument—although it should also be mentionedthat political philosophy is one surviving sub-discipline (my own, it turnsout) in which the big questions can still be explored. Even more importantly,she vividly frames the essential questions BYU faces: Are we preparing studentsto face the moral and ideological challenges they will face in today’s world?And can this challenge be met without revisiting the incentive structure thatpowerfully shapes academic careers?
Sarah Klitenic Wear seems to share my concern aboutcompartmentalization, but she in fact endorses a view of reason that identifiesit with scientific specialization. She is right about the value ofspecialization and its important role in any educational institution. Thequestion I mean to raise is whether specialization should always have the lastword. It is not enough to persuade secular peers “that the faithful can bereasonable,” for what passes as “reasonable” often is not. Academics, secularand religious alike, need to admit this in order to advance a respectfuldialogue between faith and reason, one that would challenge both to bebetter.
