The ongoing uproar after the election of Donald Trump led the sociologistn James Davison Hunter to reflect in a fresh way on the engines drivingn political conflict and social division. Back in the early 1990s, hen popularized the phrase “culture war,” the now-indispensable term ton describe the struggle for the political and cultural power to define then future of the United States. In the second decade of the twenty-firstn century, he sees that this struggle has “evolved and metastasized into an class war.” Of course, the culture war has always been a class war. Thirtyn years ago, when Hunter first began studying it, the culture war was a fightn within the broad American middle class, a contest over which of its wingsn would prevail over the other. Then as now, it pitted a new, economicallyn ascendant class of professionals and “creative industry” managers against an downwardly mobile bloc of “old economy” elites and the middle and workingn classes tied to them. Our politics are enflamed because this struggle isn ongoing, and the stakes are high. It is a battle not just for prestige butn for supremacy and rule in every domain of social life—culture, economy,n state.
n Sociologists have long recognized that culture is a means of exercisingn power and is therefore a basic component of social class. Pierre Bourdieun defined social class as the interplay between “material systems” andn “symbolic systems.” From Bourdieu’s perspective, both material goods andn cultural goods structure society. The ownership of property or membershipn in the 1 percent gives one power, to be sure. But status also plays a role,n and this kind of power arises from the possession of what Bourdieu calledn “cultural capital” taking the form of objects (like art), social practicesn (like language), and social institutions (like the university). Then president of an elite university may have far less wealth than ann investment banker or entrepreneur, but in many circumstances, he has farn more influence.n
nBourdieu’s most famous work, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, is an study of how classes use culture to classify, taking symbolic acts ton define their status, differentiate themselves from others, and legitimaten their exercise of power. In Distinction Bourdieu studied then French class system of the post–World War II era. He measured significantn differences in judgments of taste across the social classes in art, music,n literature, home decor, food, and the like. He went on to demonstrate hown these aesthetic practices serve as signs of normative distinction, rankingn people as “higher” and “lower,” or “refined” and “coarse.” This hasn political significance. The distinctions of taste do not simplyn differentiate society into parts. They organize it into a hierarchy andn legitimate that hierarchy. In Bourdieu’s words, “all the forms ofn benediction and malediction, eulogy, praise, congratulations, compliments,n or insults, reproaches, criticisms, accusations, slanders, etc.” have then effect of distinguishing people, putting them into both social and moraln categories that translate into political ones. Those who are “higher”n constitute the elite, while those who are “lower” are the masses.n
n This correlation between cultural status and political power can be seen inn the history of the United States. In the nineteenth and early twentiethn centuries, alcohol consumption was a prominent sign of distinction inn American society. One did not simply have a personal view on temperance.n One was a “Wet” or a “Dry.” These identities encompassed far more than justn attitudes toward drinking. For nearly a century, abstinence was a marker ofn membership in the native, white, Protestant, preindustrial middle class andn expressed a commitment to its values. Consumption of alcohol distinguishednone as a Catholic, an immigrant, a city-dweller, a ne’er-do-well. From the Second Great Awakening to the Civil War,n conservative Protestants dominated the country’s institutions. Theirn morality was taught in the public schools. Their churches were centraln institutions of socialization. Their clergy played prominent roles in then moral life of the country. Nearly all debate took place within the contoursn of conservative Protestant sensibilities.n
n Beginning in the 1870s, however, the influence of this Protestantn establishment began to wane. A new secular university model emerged,n supported by the rising titans of industrial capitalism. The academyn focused increasingly on research rather than on character formation. Newn professions such as psychiatry and social work arose, sometimes under then sponsorship of Protestant seminaries eager to draw upon the new prestige ofn science and academic training, but soon wholly separate from, and usuallyn rival to, churches and their ministers. In the cultural categories thenn ascendant, conservative Protestants became “fundamentalists.” The famousn 1925 Scopes trial over the teaching of evolution in public schools wasn their ultimate pyrrhic victory. By the Great Depression, conservativen Protestants had been driven from the halls of power by liberal Protestantsn and their allies. The repeal of Prohibition in 1933 was the final symbol ofn their rout. The rural and small-town Protestant middle class wasn marginalized in its own society.
n Liberal Protestants became the core of a new elite. From the 1930s to then 1970s, the mainline of American Protestantism preached critical theologyn and an earnest ethic of social responsibility. It supplied the country withn its leading hospitals, social service organizations, civic groups, nationaln youth organizations, architectural touchstones, and political elites.n Mainline Protestant institutions commanded tremendous prestige. In 1930n John D. Rockefeller Jr. built Riverside Church in Upper Manhattan for then prominent anti-fundamentalist Baptist minister Harry Emerson Fosdick so then latter could preach modernist theology to a self-consciouslyn interdenominational congregation. Rockefeller’s money later enabled then National Council of Churches, an ecumenical Christian organization bornn from the social gospel movement, to construct its famous Interchurch Centern across the street. In 1958 President Dwight Eisenhower laid the building’sn cornerstone in a ceremony attended by the president of the United Nationsn General Assembly.n
n In this era, the Catholic Church emerged as liberals’ primary antagonist.n Whether in religion, language, ethnicity, region, political party, orn social class, the liberal Protestant elite differed greatly from whatn looked like not simply the new immigrant masses but a rival powern structure. Contraception became a powerful sign of distinction. Small,n planned families had long been a hallmark of mainline Protestant life. Then Episcopal Church endorsed birth control in 1930, followed quickly by then Federal Council of Churches (predecessor to the National Council ofn Churches) in 1931. After World War II, American elites were rallying behindn contraception as both a liberal cause for freedom at home and an technological fix for rapid population growth abroad. Association withn contraception, sterilization, and eventually abortion signaledn respectability and elite status. Former presidents Dwight Eisenhower andn Harry Truman co-chaired a national Planned Parenthood fundraisingn committee. John Kennedy, America’s only Catholic president, endorsed familyn planning as a component of U.S. development assistance. In his popularn anti-Catholic book American Freedom and Catholic Power, publishedn in a second edition in 1958, Paul Blanshard noted that “birth control hasn won both acceptance and respectability in the United States. Almost alln well-to-do people in the country practice it.” He also noted thatn respectable people had come to support “eugenic sterilization” of those whon are “diseased, feebleminded, and a menace to normal community life.”
n Over time the class distinction of contraception disappeared. The moraln acceptability of birth control became nearly universal, while Catholic andn Protestant fertility rates equalized. Elite campaigns to liberalizen abortion laws, culminating in the Roe decision, reoriented socialn debate without producing a definitive pro-choice class culture. Attitudesn toward contraception, fertility, and family size receded as clearn indicators of class status.n
n Liberal Protestants’ post-sixties demographic and institutional free falln added to the blurring of the older social divide of elite Protestant versusn striving Catholic. Yet even as mainline institutions rapidly declined fromn their midcentury zenith, the ethos of liberal Protestantism conquered then larger culture. Today the twin ideals of the authority of individualn experience and a commitment to social criticism are dominant, the former an secularized version of Protestant modernism’s emphasis on experience overn dogma, the latter a descendant of the social gospel movement and liberaln Protestantism’s missionary cosmopolitanism. By conquering society’s leadingn cultural institutions, liberal Protestantism essentially made its ownn churches and congregations redundant.n
n Yet the liberal Protestant engines of class distinction were not destroyedn in the process. They were merely moved out of the churches and reinstalledn in the old-line WASP colleges and universities. Those who would have beenn Episcopalians and Congregationalists in a prior era were nown post-Protestants, less ethnically homogeneous and increasingly religiouslyn unaffiliated, but still in charge. If anything, elite power has increased.n Harvard, Yale, and Princeton are far wealthier than they were during then decades of liberal Protestant dominance, and they exercise greater power.n As Bourdieu recognized, however, status is buttressed by superiority inn “taste.” As the old cultural markers of class distinctions receded, then post-Protestant elite needed new ways with which to legitimate theirn authority and condemn their rivals. By the 1990s, contraception’s culturaln charge had all but run out, and the country even became somewhat moren conservative on abortion. The time was ripe for a new elite to cultivate an new sign of distinction.n
n As early as 2005, polls showed a plurality of Americans with advancedn degrees supported same-sex marriage. College graduates overall tilted ton supporting marriage for same-sex couples around 2008. Not until 2011 did an majority of the country overall support legal recognition. Since consistentn opinion polling on homosexuality began in the 1970s, highern professionals—engineers, computer scientists, accountants, professors,n lawyers, physicians—have always been the most supportive class. Highern managers began to catch up in the 1990s. Throughout the past four decades,n there has existed a clear relationship between social class and views onn homosexuality. The more economic and cultural capital one has, the moren likely one is to support gay and lesbian identities and sexual practices.
n Changes in elite family practices help explain the symbolic resonance ofn same-sex marriage. A model of the ideal family is central to class culture.n It defines proper expression of sexual desire and the proper relationshipn between the sexes, and in this way defines the meaning of homosexuality. Inn their 2010 bookn n Red Families v. Blue Families: Legal Polarization and the Creation of Culture, Naomi Cahn and June Carbone identify a “blue family” model characteristicn of America’s contemporary elites. In this model, marriage is orderedn primarily toward companionship. The equality of partners is the normativen core of the family. Gender roles are weakly differentiated and inherentlyn suspect. Fertility is optional, intentional, and comparatively low inn practice. Religion plays little role in regulating sexual behavior. Thisn model is not only perfectly compatible with same-sex marriage. To some,n same-sex (usually professional, usually lesbian) couples are a social idealn precisely because they so faithfully live out the blue family model.n
n There is another factor at work: the ideology of diversity. Diversity isn not only the reigning social and political ideal of our age. It is also an class ideology. According to diversity ideology, when properly managed,n pluralism cultivates creativity, productivity, profitability, workn satisfaction, cognitive skills, personal character, individual careern success, and social harmony. Homosexuality occupies a favorable symbolicn location in this ideology. Not only has the gay rights movement literallyn wrapped itself in the rainbow flag of diversity; gays and lesbians alson symbolize the individualist and success-oriented values of diversity.n Understanding homosexuality as a powerful brew of authenticity and prestigen helps make sense of the level of enthusiasm in “creative class” support forn same-sex marriage. It doesn’t hurt that gay men and lesbians pose non challenge to elites. In fact, they are often elites themselves. Partneredn gay men and partnered lesbians are overrepresented in the highestn professional and managerial ranks, which means the imperative of inclusionn ends up legitimating efforts to hire and promote people who, like othern elites, have often graduated from prestigious universities, come fromn well-off families, and bring the same standards of upper-class “taste” ton companies and firms. Privileging the normalization of homosexuality rathern than, say, racial integration allows elites to have their diversity caken and eat it, too.n
n Support for the normalization of homosexuality and same-sex marriage hasn thus proven itself a valuable mark of distinction in the class culturen wars. Active proponents of “traditional” marriage are regularly discouragedn from practicing or purged from professions such as psychiatry, psychology,n social work, law, and higher education. The perceived incompatibility ofn professional status with cultural conservatism is so accepted that then former chair of the American Psychological Association’s Policy andn Planning Board recommends that dissenters from “the demands ofn multiculturally informed, ethical practice . . . should probably find an different line of work.” In 2014, Reuters reviewed more than one hundredn court filings on the subject of same-sex marriage and found that thirty ofn the country’s two hundred largest law firms represented challengers ton state Defense of Marriage Acts, while not a single Am Law 200 firm wasn representing state DOMA supporters. Judicial refusal to conduct same-sexn marriages is considered a violation of professional ethics in nearly alln states, and judges in Washington, Oregon, Alabama, Ohio, and Wyoming haven been subjected to disciplinary procedures. A 2007 survey found thatn Evangelicals and Mormons are the least liked religious groups amongn American university faculty by a wide margin. A 2008 survey revealed thatn Christian fundamentalists, Evangelicals, and Mormons were the most likelyn of twenty-seven social groups to experience discrimination in academicn hiring. Across nine different fields in the humanities, social sciences,n and physical sciences, even transgender and communist applicants facedn better job prospects.
n Elites use their support of homosexuality to elevate themselves, accordingn themselves distinction in a moral sense. The “contact hypothesis”—an sociological claim that one’s views of marginalized groups grow moren positive through greater personal contact with them—is a favorite amongn elites, despite having rather mixed empirical support. This empatheticn theory of the normalization of homosexuality does, however, contain an strong moral undertone that flatters precisely those who have changed theirn opinions through contact with gay men and lesbians, or who believe as muchn about themselves. Consider Martha Nussbaum’s 2010 bookn n From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law. Nussbaum depicts America’s public debate over homosexuality and same-sexn marriage as a Manichean clash. In her view, the “forces of imagination andn humanity” contest with a rogue’s gallery of high-caste Indians, Southernn white supremacists, German Nazis, and their fellow travelers who practice an “politics of disgust” reflecting “some deeper sort of anxiety or aversion.”n One need not guess which side Nussbaum is on.n
n Or recall Hillary Clinton’s infamous condemnation of Donald Trump’s “basketn of deplorables” in September 2016. This remark was made at the “LGBT forn Hillary Gala” held at the Cipriani restaurant on Wall Street. Amy Chozickn reported in the New York Times that Clinton had been using thisn line throughout the campaign in private settings. It had “always got an laugh over living-room chats in the Hamptons, at dinner parties under then stars on Martha’s Vineyard, over passed hors d’oeuvres in Beverly Hills,n and during sunset cocktails in Silicon Valley.” Unfortunately for Clintonn and her presidential prospects, on this occasion a few deplorables weren listening in. Nussbaum’s hope that the courts would continue to advance then cause of imagination and humanity (because “democratic majorities can’t yetn be trusted”) was ultimately realized in 2015. If only the forces ofn darkness had had their ability to vote for president likewise restricted,n the 2016 election could have brought a similar triumph.n
n The stakes in any cultural clash are high. All the combatants know as much.n No wonder they fight so hard. The class that succeeds in consolidating itsn own culture and making it mandatory for anyone who wants to gain entry inton the elite gets to sit at the top of the social hierarchy. Its class ethosn becomes society’s ethic, defining what is elevated versus what is base,n what is natural versus what is abnormal, what is unquestioned versus whatn is questioned, what is rational versus what is irrational or even insane.n The fight is over nothing less than who has the power to define reality. Ton lose such a fight is not just to be consigned to the wrong side of historyn or become the point of reference for “that’s not who we are.” It is to haven the weight of the dominant culture pressed firmly against you, peeling awayn members of your side and undermining the ability and willingness of then remainder to resist. It is to be denied access to elite institutions andn networks, and to all the material and social benefits they confer. It isn even to have the force of law and thus ultimately the power of the staten used against you.
n Those who dissent from the new affirmation of homosexuality, and nown transgenderism, have sought to avoid more serious legal sanctions by meansn of state-level Religious Freedom Restoration Acts. When they originated inn the 1990s, RFRAs were uncontroversial, bipartisan, and widely popular. Then ACLU dwelled with the Christian Legal Society, and the Nationaln Association of Evangelicals lay down with the American Humanistn Association. By 2015 they were being condemned by progressives as a “swordn of discrimination.” In the face of remarkably united elite opposition,n these laws have proven to be of limited use. Where elites are mostn plentiful and powerful, namely the Northeast and the Pacific coast,n meaningful state-level RFRAs don’t exist at all. Even in conservativen states with moderate numbers of elites, such as Arizona, Georgia, andn Indiana, RFRAs have been either defeated or stripped of any power ton protect traditionalists. Only in elite deserts such as Mississippi andn Louisiana have such laws passed in strong forms.n
n Demonstrating their ever-growing commitment to the distinction of LGBTn rights, in 2016 elites marshaled a full-scale economic and legal assault onn the state of North Carolina. In March of that year, the state legislaturen passed and the governor signed the Public Facilities Privacy and Securityn Act, better known as the “North Carolina bathroom bill.” This lawn overturned a Charlotte ordinance granting transgender persons free accessn to sex-segregated facilities of their choice and instead required alln persons to use sex-segregated facilities in a manner consistent with then sex recorded on their birth certificate. Within a week of passage, the LGBTn rights organization Human Rights Campaign organized more than eighty topn executives from major firms including Goldman Sachs, Bank of America,n Apple, and United Airlines. They signed a letter urging the governor ton work toward a repeal of the law. PayPal publicly cancelled its plans ton open a new global operations center in the state. Over the summer and fall,n the state’s movie and television industries dried up; the Nationaln Basketball Association pulled its planned 2017 all-star game out ofn Charlotte; the NCAA removed seven championship tournaments from the state,n including the first and second rounds of 2017 “March Madness” basketball;n and the real estate research firm CoStar Group announced it had chosennVirginia over North Carolina for its new research operations center. Forbes magazine estimated that the bathroom bill had cost then state economy more than $600 million in lost investment and revenue in onlyn seven months.n
n The strategy proved effective. Although Donald Trump comfortably won then state’s presidential ballot by nearly 175,000 votes, the Republicann governor lost by 10,000 and became North Carolina’s first sitting governorn in nearly 170 years to lose reelection. While Trump’s victory ended then federal government’s pressure on the state, the capital strike againstn North Carolina continued. In order to get out from under the boot of bign business—what former Forbes 400 entrepreneur Tim Gill calls a “punish then wicked” strategy—the Republican-led state legislature repealed then bathroom bill in March 2017.n
n Back when Massachusetts was the only state in the country to recognizen same-sex marriage, Chai Feldblum, who later served as commissioner of then Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under both Presidents Obama andn Trump, observed that religious liberty and LGBT rights were trapped in an “zero-sum game.” In her view, any pretense to mutually beneficialn compromise between the two is impossible, and state neutrality between themn a charade. As long as religious conservatives hold same-sex sexual behaviorn to be morally suspect while cultural liberals hold it to be natural andn moral, every action and inaction of the state is a choice to recognize onen side against the other. While classical liberals may want to wish thisn conflict away, it cannot be done. Appeals to First Amendment rights ton religious liberty run immediately into Fourteenth Amendment rights to equaln protection. And as the great theorist of class struggle Karl Marx himselfn observed, “between equal rights force decides.”
n Culture wars are never strictly cultural. They are always economic andn political struggles as well. Elites rule through an interlockingn political-economic-cultural system. The mainstream media certifies whosen political ideas are respectable and whose are extremist. Hollywood, Siliconn Valley, Wall Street, academia, and white-shoe professional firms are alln part of the postindustrial “knowledge economy” that allocates economicn rewards. As American elites become increasingly integrated and culturallyn homogenous, they begin to treat their cultural rivals as subordinaten classes. The same thing happened nearly a century ago to the rural andn small-town Protestants whom H. L. Mencken derided as the “booboisie.” Manyn would like to see it happen again, this time to anyone who challenges then dogmas of diversity and progressivism that have become suspiciouslyn universal among the richest and most powerful Americans, dominating then elite institutions they control. If cultural traditionalists want ton survive, they must not only acknowledge but embrace the class dimensions ofn the culture war.n
Darel E. Paul is professor of political science at Williams College and author of From Tolerance to Equality: How Elites Brought America to Same-Sex Marriage.
